PSI - Issue 84

Chiara Galatà et al. / Procedia Structural Integrity 84 (2026) 1–8

7

B12 B13 B14 B15 B16 B17 B18 B19 B20

No / Yes No / Yes No / No No / No No / No No / No No / No No / No No / Yes

CS3–4 / Yes CS3–4 / Yes CS2–3 / No CS2–3 / No CS2–3 / No CS2–3 / No CS2–3 / No CS2–3 / No

Reinforced Reinforced

AII / Mgmt AII / Mgmt AII / Mgmt AII / Mgmt AII / Mgmt AII / Mgmt AII / Mgmt AII / Mgmt AII / Exec

Periodic detailed Periodic detailed Periodic detailed Periodic detailed Periodic detailed Periodic detailed

CS4 / Yes

Reinforced

Applied across the same 20 bridges, the international frameworks deliver consistent signals from the same evidence: what MIT captures as High/Medium – High structural priority is echoed as LRFR checks (US), CS4/structural review (Caltrans), Targeted → Reinforced/Repair (CEREMA), and AII with proportionate measures (RBK). Divergences lie mainly in the decision artefacts–risk index vs element states vs surveillance ladder vs reliability check–rather than in the underlying field observations. In particular, defectiveness (the only subjective primary) remains the dominant driver: higher levels push US outcomes towards rating/operational restrictions, calibrate Caltrans towards CS3–CS4 & review, escalate CEREMA to targeted/reinforced actions, and place RBK verifications at AII with Exec/Mgmt measures as needed. For Medium cases, Caltrans and CEREMA maintain diagnostic discipline (CS2–3; periodic + targeted), while RBK leverages AII to avoid premature strengthening through model–based verification (and proof–load testing where warranted). Overall, a hybrid pathway – MIT AC → CEREMA diagnostics for PT – critical suspects → RBK AII reliability check before heavy works → Caltrans element – level data for budgeting – emerges as a practical synthesis for PTPC grid – deck bridges. 5. Conclusions In this paper four different regulatory approaches for existing PTPC bridges–Italy (MIT–2020), United States (NBIS/BIRM + AASHTO MBE and Caltrans), France (CEREMA/ITSEOA Fasc. 32) and the Netherlands (RWS RBK) –were shown and applied to 20 case–study bridges on the Catania–Palermo motorway. Using the MIT–2020 workflow as a baseline (with AC–Structural/Seismic derived from primary parameters and with defectiveness as the only subjective primary), we re–interpreted the same evidence under the US, French and Dutch systems to obtain like–for–like decisions. Across frameworks, the signal from defectiveness is consistently the main driver of priority. High/Medium–High AC under MIT aligns well with LRFR checks/operational decisions in US practice, CS4/structural review in Caltrans, Targeted → Reinforced/Repair in CEREMA, and AII/AIII with proportionate measures in RBK. Divergences are due less to field evidence and more to the decision artefacts used by each system (risk index vs element states vs surveillance ladder vs reliability check). 5.1. Strengths and limitations by framework • MIT–2020 (Italy) – Strengths: clear risk–based prioritisation (AC), scalable Levels 0–5, explicit triggers for special inspections on PT. Limits: diagnostic depth is delegated; quantitative acceptance criteria sit outside the AC logic, so borderline cases may escalate conservatively. • US NBIS/BIRM + AASHTO MBE (US) – Strengths: strong programme governance (QC/QA, training), rating (LRFR) directly tied to posting/closure. Limits: prescriptive PT diagnostics are limited; inspection outputs alone do not standardise what to test for PT anomalies. • Caltrans (element–level) (California, US) – Strengths: granular condition data (CS1–CS4) useful for deterioration modelling and budgeting; consistent field language. Limits: not risk–indexed by default; mapping condition to structural safety still requires rating/engineering judgement.