PSI - Issue 20

Marina Zakharova / Procedia Structural Integrity 20 (2019) 108–112 Marina Zakharova / Structural Integrity Procedia 00 (2019) 000 – 000

110

3

The solution of the rehabilitation problem of the broken ecosystems has to rely on an integrated approach with carrying out environmental monitoring of pollution of water basins, soils, ground rainfall, development on its fundamentals of the integrated technologies of rehabilitation and control of their efficiency and quality of cleaning. The main hazard in reservoirs leading to catastrophic consequences of high material damage and human casualties is associated with the possibility of explosion and fire. The main reasons for reservoir explosion are considered by Bolshakov and Zakharova (2014), Makhutov et al. (2016), where oil product reservoir fell within the fire front is 18%; static electricity impact on the oil product reservoir – 9 %; violation of technical and industrial safety rules – 55 %; diversion – 9 %; impact of sharp fluctuation of temperature – 9 %; explosion of the next equipment – 9 %. According to the results of analyzing and systematizing the data on accidents in oil product vessels at low operating temperature, event trees for a reservoir explosion is developed, fig. 2. We consider the most hazardous scenario 4 (fig.2). Conditional probability of this scenario is defined as the work of conditional probabilities of the next events: explosion in gas space of the reservoir, the fire, failure of the reservoir with P 1 probability → formation of the burning hydrodynamic wave of break, ridging failure, spreading of the burning oil product across the territory of an object – P 2 → defeat of the next reservoirs - P 3 → defeat of personnel - P 4 . The frequency of the most hazardous scenario was 1.35 ∙ 10 -5 1/ year. According to the developed "event trees" for a reservoir explosion, we estimate the individual risk at implementation of scenario 4. The individual risk in an area of coverage of an open flame at implementation of the most dangerous scenario 4 will be 1.35 ∙ 10 -5 1/year. The fire risk for personnel is considered to be absolutely acceptable if the individual risk is less than 10 -6 1/year, and certainly unacceptable if the individual risk is more than 10 -4 1/year. If the individual risk is in the range from 10 -6 to 10 -4 1/year, then it is accepted that the fire risk is in a zone of strict control of risk. In this zone the risk is considered admissible only when the measures allowing to reduce it are taken.

Damage to neighboring facilities

The fire of spillage in limits the protecting construction, interfering spreading the burning oil product

No data on injured people

Scenario 1,

Н (S )=6.6  1 0 -6

1/ год

1

Р = 0.09

Injured people

Scenario 2,

Р = 0.73

No damage to neighboring facilities

Н (S )=2.9  1 0 -5

Р = 0.44 No injured people Р = 0.56

1/ год

2

Р = 0.91

Scenario 3,

Explosion in gas space of the reservoir, the fire, failure of the reservoir

Н (S )=3.7  1 0 -5

1/ год

3

Damage to neighboring facilities

Injured people

Р = 1

Scenario 4,

Formation of the burning hydrodynamic wave of break,ridging failure, spreading of the burning oil product across the territory of an object

1

Н (S )=1.35  1 0 -5

Р = 1

1/ год

max

4

No injured people

Р = 0.5

Scenario 5,

3

Н (S )=0 1/ год

Р = 0

5

Injured people

Р = 0.27

Scenario 6,

No damage to neighboring facilities

2

Н (S )=6.75  1 0 -6

Р = 0.5

1/ год

6

No injured people

Р = 0.5

Н (S )=6.75  1 0 -6 Scenario 7,

Р = 0.5

1/ год

7

Fig. 2 Event trees for a reservoir explosion at low temperatures