PSI - Issue 84

Guerino Liberatore et al. / Procedia Structural Integrity 84 (2026) 702–708

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1. Introduction The increasing frequency of geodynamic events and the evolving landscape of anthropogenic threats have necessitated a paradigm shift from traditional protection to comprehensive resilience in critical infrastructure management. In the European context, this shift is codified in Directive (EU) 2022/2557 (European Union, 2022), known as the CER Directive, which seeks to enhance the resilience of entities providing essential services. This legislative push is part of a broader "Digital Decade" strategy, where the EU aims to harmonize regulatory frameworks across member states to secure the digital and physical transformation of critical sectors (Gsenger and Sekwenz, 2025). This policy evolution is complemented by a cybersecurity strategy designed to create a "European Cyber Shield" (Muzyka, 2021) and the strategic protection of space-based assets, which are increasingly vital for terrestrial transport networks (Georgescu et al., 2025). In Italy, this framework was transposed via Italian Legislative Decree 134/2024 (Italy, 2024), imposing specific technical and procedural obligations on "critical entities" to ensure continuity of service. A fundamental challenge in this field is the conceptual demarcation between safety and security. While safety traditionally focuses on accidental or non-malicious events, security addresses deliberate and malicious acts such as terrorism, sabotage, or hacking (Jore, 2019). Modern resilience must bridge this gap, recognizing that the reliability of essential services depends on both aspects. The complexity of these systems is further exacerbated by the "commercialization" of services. The transition from state-run to private management - the so-called "Invisible Hand" - has introduced challenges for national security, as commercial objectives may not align with public resilience requirements (Newlove-Eriksson et al., 2018). This often leads to "institutional resilience" where asymmetric interdependencies between the state and private providers prevent the effective enforcement of delegation contracts (Weiss and Heinkelmann-Wild, 2020). Consequently, managing emergencies requires a sophisticated understanding of governance networks and cross-sector mechanisms (Rydén Sonesson et al., 2021). The transport sector, serving as a vital backbone for societal continuity, remains particularly vulnerable to disruptions that trigger cascading failures across interdependent domains (Lindbergh et al., 2024). These interdependencies are not merely physical but also cybernetic, geographic, and logical, creating a complex web where a failure in one node can rapidly incapacitate distant systems (Luiijf and Klaver, 2004; Rinaldi, 2004; Rinaldi et al., 2001). For instance, disruptions in power grids or digital networks directly impact transportation logistics and emergency response capabilities (Piraina and Trucco, 2022). Furthermore, transport activities involving dangerous substances pose significant risks of "domino effects" where a primary accident triggers a sequence of secondary events, such as fires or toxic releases, in densely populated or industrially sensitive areas (Egidi et al., 1995; Necci et al., 2015). The role of safety barriers and quantitative risk assessment becomes crucial in mitigating these escalation frequencies (Fiorentini, 2021; Fiorentini and Marmo, 2018; Landucci et al., 2016). To mitigate these risks, the integration of emerging technologies and advanced modeling is paramount. Digital twins enable real-time simulation and proactive risk mitigation (Bucaioni et al., 2026), while machine learning offers a strategic advantage in identifying anomalies (Achuthan et al., 2025; Al-Thani, 2025). Moreover, simulation-based approaches allow for the characterization of "node vitality" and "agility" helping operators estimate the benefits of improved information-sharing processes (Petrenj and Trucco, 2014). Understanding the holistic behavior of these infrastructures under stress requires models that explicitly account for their mutual dependencies (Rinaldi, 2004). Recent extreme weather events, such as the 2024 Valencia floods, underscore the necessity for advanced monitoring (Castro-Melgar et al., 2025) and a coordinated European effort to manage cross-border impacts (Ruiten et al., 2016). These disruptions also carry heavy social costs, disproportionately affecting vulnerable populations and remote areas where infrastructure assets are already endangered (Delgado et al., 2023; Große et al., 2021). This research focuses on the Abruzzo Region in Central Italy, a territory characterized by complex orography and frequent geodynamic events, making it an ideal "living laboratory" for evaluating adaptive capacities. Current crisis management frameworks in the region often encounter structural bottlenecks, particularly regarding horizontal coordination between public administrations and private operators. This paper aims to address these gaps by first analyzing the governance pyramid, mapping responsibilities from the Presidency of the Council of Ministers down to the operational level of Prefectures and Regional Agencies. Furthermore, it identifies information-sharing mechanisms to break down the silos between stakeholders, such as the Civil Protection Agency and National Agency for the Safety of Railways and Road and Highway Infrastructures (ANSFISA). Finally, the study proposes a scalable regional