PSI - Issue 28

Dmitry O. Reznikov et al. / Procedia Structural Integrity 28 (2020) 1360–1368 D.Reznikov, N.Makhutov,O.Yudina / Structural Integrity Procedia 00 (2019) 000–000

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Thus if the individual risk associated with the operation of the HIF falls into the range II of conditionally acceptable risks, then in order to obtain permission for further operation of the system, it is necessary to fulfill a number of requirements: - Sources and magnitude of risk, as well as various options for implementing protective measures, should be carefully evaluated. - Risks should be reduced to the level of practical expediency due to actually available (limited) resources in accordance with the ALARP principle. -With the improvement of existing and the emergence of new protective technologies, the practically appropriate level of acceptable risk should be reviewed in the direction of meeting more stringent safety standards. Therefore, the value of the tolerable individual risk R i * for the facility in question is not a fixed value, it should be decreased as new capabilities and safety tools become available. It follows that the satisfaction of the ALARP principle is not a one-time event, but a continuous process that takes place throughout the service life of the hazardous industrial facility. Acknowledgments This work was financially supported by the Russian Foundation for Basic Research (Grant No 16-58-48008 Ind omi). References Makhutov, N., Akhmetkhanov R., Reznikov D., et al., 2006. Safety of Russia. Risk Analysis and Safety Issues. Part 2. Safety of civil and defense complexes and risk management. Znanie Publishers. Moscow, pp.434 (in Russian). Makhutov, N., Reznikov, D., 2012. Assessment and Regulation of Risks During the Operation of Complex Technical Systems. Safety in Technosphere 5, 3-9 (in Russian). Makhutov, N., Reznikov D., Petrov V., 2012. The principle of practical expediency in Regulation of Individual Risk. Safety in Technosphere. 6 . 7-12 (in Russian). Makhutov, N., Reznikov, D., 2019. Assessment of large-scale catastrophes in complex engineering systems. IOP Conference Series: Materials Science and Engineering. 481. Shubinsky, I., Zamyshlyaev, A., 2015. Railway risk management. Proceedings of the international scientific school. Modeling and analysis of safety and risk in complex systems. 210-214. HSE (Health and Safety Executive), 2002. Policy and Guidance on Reducing Risks as Low as Reasonably in Design. (www. Hse.gov.uk/dst/alarp3.htm). HSE (Health and Safety Executive), 2001- “Reducing Risks, Protecting People: HSE’s Decision-making Process. Risk Assessment Policy Unit, Health and Safety Executive. ” HSE Books, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London Bowles, D., Anderson, L.,2003. Risk-informed Dam Safety Decision-making. ANCOLD Bulletin 123:91-103 Bowles, D.S. 2004. ALARP evaluation: Using cost effectiveness and disproportionality to justify risk reduction. ANCOLD Bulletin 127:89-106.